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We regard the Newcomb’s Paradox as a reduction of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and search for the
considerable quantum solution. The all known classical solutions to the Newcomb’s problem always
imply that human has freewill and is due to the unfair set-up(including strategies) of the Newcomb’s
Problem. For this reason, we here substitute the asymmetric payoff matrix to the general form of
the payoff matrix (M) and consider both of them use the same quantum strategy. As a result we
obtained the fair Nash equilibrium, which is better than the case using classical strategies. This
means that whether the supernatural being has the precognition or not depends only on the choice
of strategy.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
A quantum game theory is a natural extension to the
quantum world of the ubiquitous classical game theory.
Von Neumann pointed out [1], a game is simply the to-
tality of the rule which describe it. The elements of the
rule such as the rational choices(strategies) are one of the
main component of a general game. Moveover a game as-
sumed that each individual player is trying to maximize
his own advantage, without concern for the well-being of
the other players. After the theory of the ganeral game
has been broken down into details [2], we can meet sev-
eral games to play more efficiently for his profits. For
example, von Neumann’s the mathematical approaches
help us rational decision for the economic behavior, which
strategies are fit and what’s the causal relationship. The
Darwin’s theory for the ’survival of fittest’ is maybe the
another well-known game, the evolutionary theory, de-
scribe the biological evolution in nature, it is described
by the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy(ESS) [3].
Here, we present two games known as the Prisoner’s
dilemma(PD) [4] and the Newcomb’s Paradox(NP) [5].
Those game have some irrational consequence, i.e., the
players cannot concurrently increase their payoff using a
certain strategy in the PD. Also in the NP case, the su-
pernatural being(SB)’s prophecy fail to facing human’s
freewill surprisingly. Game theorists maybe call this am-
biguous situation as a dilemma or paradox for a given
competition. We will solve the NP under the well-known
PD solution, which means the PD’s symmetric consider-
ation helpful to grasp the NP.
The classical games, as long as its history, form a var-
ious kinds of game contained certain rules and it also
have studied deeply. Its solutions of the dilemmatic view
point are generally solved by the Nash equilibrium gov-
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erned by a dominant strategy. While the usual quantum
games [4, 6] have comparatively short history, but their
solution shows the similar Nash equilibrium pattern—
the changed Nash equilibrium can be compared to the
classical one. Meyer has already proved [6] that an op-
timal quantum strategy in a two-person zero-sum game
surpass against to an optimal classical (mixed) strategy.
If the participant, Alice, is using a probabilistic (mixed)
quantum strategies against to Bob’s the deterministic
classical strategies, then Alice always win to Bob on the
game. Furthermore a two-person static game has a Nash
equilibrium for the quantum versus quantum strategy.
For consider the NP, SB’s deterministic prophecy gives
an unfair situation for the human’s probabilistic strate-
gies. So we need to reconstruct the original payoff to the
new reasonable payoff structure.
II. CLASSICAL STRATEGY AND ITS
SOLUTION
A. NP and PD in the Classical Game
In the PD each of the players, Alice and Bob, must in-
dependently decide whether they choose to defect (strat-
egy D) or cooperate (strategy C). Depending on their
decision, each player receives a certain payoff Πk. The
strategy D is the dominant and will be in equilibrium,
i.e., {ΣA,ΣB} = {D,D} and {ΠA(ΣA),ΠB(ΣB)} =
{1, 1} in this game. A dominant strategy for Alice
is defined by a strategy ΣA such that the payoff ΠA
has the property ΠA(ΣA,Σ
j
B) ≥ ΠA(ΣiA,ΣjB) for all
ΣiA ∈ SA,ΣjB ∈ SB provided such a strategy exists,
where i, j ∈ N . The strategy set Sk ≃ {Σik} con-
tains the all strategies i ∈ N , where N is the number
of the all possible strategies in the game and k denote
the players A or B. Moreover Nash equilibrium, corre-
sponding to the payoff {1, 1}, is a combination of strate-
gies {ΣA,ΣB} such that neither party can increase his
or her payoff by unilaterally departing from the given
2TABLE I: The payoff matrix for the traditional Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The first entry in the round bracket denotes the
payoff of Alice and the second one the payoff of Bob.
Bob: C Bob: D
Alice: C (3, 3) (0, 5)
Alice: D (5, 0) (1, 1)
TABLE II: The payoff matrix for the original Newcomb’s
Paradox. The elements of the matrix will give to human for
his reward.
SB: Box1 SB: Box2
Human: Box1 $1 000 000 0
Human: Box2 $1 001 000 $1 000
equilibrium point i.e., ΠA(ΣA,ΣB) ≥ ΠA(ΣiA,ΣB) and
ΠB(ΣA,ΣB) ≥ ΠB(ΣA,ΣjB). Another main concept of
a game theory is the Pareto optimality, a pair of payoffs
{ΣA,ΣB} = {3, 3}, if it is not jointly dominated by an-
other point, and if neither party can increase his or her
payoff without decreasing the payoff to the other party.
Someone perhaps ask that the strategy {C,C} is more
rational decision. But the dominant strategy D controls
the PD.
The NP is said to be a one-person asymmetric game
such that the human’s freewill conflict against to the SB’s
prophecy. That is, given two boxes, Box1 and Box2,
Box2 which contains $1 000 and Box1 which contains
either nothing or $1 000 000, the human may pick ei-
ther Box1 or both. However, at some time before the
choice is made by human, SB has predicted what the hu-
man’s decision will be made [7]. Thereafter SB will fill up
the Box1 with $1 000 000 if SB predicts human to take
it, or with nothing if SB predicts human to take both
boxes. The constructionally important notion of the NP
is no other than its one-person game as the restricted
two-person game PD’s [8]. We can see the original asym-
metric payoff matrix for human in Table II.
B. Extended form of NP and PD
Von Neumann referred to the fact that game theory
only concern with the relation of the elements of the
payoff matrix. So that in this paper, we can consider
the extended version of the NP and PD. The general
form of the corresponding payoff matrix is denoted
by M = M1 + M2 where M1 =
(
α 0
0 γ
)
and
M2 =
(
0 δ
β 0
)
, M2 will be considered as two special
case, an asymmetric payoff matrix and the quasi-skew
symmetric matrix. Moreover we fix the matrix elements,
in the payoff matrix, along to β > α > γ > δ and δ ≤ 0.
TABLE III: The payoff matrix for the extended Newcomb’s
Paradox. The entry δ(< 0) restrict the human’s choice.
SB: Box1 SB: Box2
Human: Box1 α δ
Human: Box2 β γ
(i) Asymmetric payoff matrix A: If the matrix M is
satisfied some next property
A = A1 +A2 (1)
where A1 = M1 is a diagonal matrix, A2 =
(
0 δ
β 0
)
6=
A2T is an off-diagonal asymmetric matrix with |δ| < β,
then we call the matrix A as the asymmetric. Specially,
the case of δ = 0 occurs the original NP and PD.
(ii) Quasi-skew symmetric payoff matrix S: The payoff
matrix M is defined as a quasi-skew symmetric matrix
S i.e., decomposed by
S = S1 + S2 (2)
where S1 =M1 is a diagonal matrix, S2 =
(
0 −β
β 0
)
is
the skew-symmetric matrix which satisfies the property
S2T = −S2. If we generally allow the extended payoff
matrix M to the traditional NP, then one can naturally
extend the matrix as corresponding two-person symmet-
ric PD in Table III-IV. As we see previously, the payoff
matrix of the symmetric PD is more clear to interpret
and easy to calculate the solution. Thereafter we will
change the formation from the two-person’s PD to the
one-person’s NP. Here we must consider a sense of the
leaping element δ in the matrixM. The payoff values, all
elements of the matrix for human in the original NP, have
always a positive value more than 0. This means that the
payoffs are only beneficial to human, moreover he does
cheat SB using the convex combination of the classical
mixed strategies. The set-up is unreasonable and one-
sided i.e., trying wouldn’t do any harm for human. If
we give a negative payoff element −β, the case (ii), for
the player such as SB’s penalty for human’s cheating or
human’s entry fee, perhaps some anticipointment for an
untruth of SB’s prophecy. Likewise the solution for the
PD, the element δ 6= −β also gives a corresponding Nash
equilibrium. We adapt the Nash equilibrium consider as
the quantum solution to the NP i.e., if human choose α
then SB can exactly predict the human’s choice α.
III. QUANTUM STRATEGY
A. Quantum Strategies and Quantum Circuit
A general quantum game Γ is consisted of the player
k, strategy Σˆk ∈ Sˆk ⊂ Uˆk ≡ Uˆk(θ, φ) and payoff Πk
3TABLE IV: The payoff matrix for the extended Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Alice correspond to human and Bob to SB, also C
change to the Box1 strategy and D equal to the Box2.
SB: Box1 SB: Box2
Human: Box1 (α, α) (δ, β)
Human: Box2 (β, δ) (γ, γ)
like as the general classical game [9]. But the strate-
gic space Sˆk is comparatively large space chosen from Uˆ ,
Sˆk ⊂ Uˆk ⊆ Uˆ , Uˆ ≡ {Uˆ(θ, φ)|θ ∈ [0, pi] and φ ∈ [0, pi/2]}
in Hilbert space H, compare to the classical determin-
istic space Sk. The quantum games are following the
next trivial stages. First, the well-known initial states
are prepared by a umpire or the public renouncement,
because the fairness of the game is ensured by its open
source of the payoff. In PD, we set the initial state as
two qubit state |00〉. Next step, both player conflict to
win the game with the given strategy set Sˆk ⊂ Uˆk, which
is the quantum mechanical operation. Main point of a
game maybe make out what is the best strategy in the
confliction. Finally, the last step is some detection of the
game result by quantum measurement.
We denote the initial state of the game by |ψ0〉 = Jˆ |00〉,
where Jˆ is a unitary operation executed by an umpire and
the adjustment of the parameter τ gives a separable or
entangled states. The unitary operation Jˆ is described
by Jˆ = e{iτU˜⊗U˜/2}, where τ ∈ [0, pi/2] and U˜ ∈ Uˆ(θ, φ)
stand for the selected operation by an umpire. In fact, τ
is said to be a measure for the game’s entanglement i.e.,
τ = pi/2 means the maximally entangled state. If we have
prepared the initial game setup such as the separable or
entangled state, then we can paly PD in each player’s
strategic space Sˆk. Each player may execute own’s qubit
by Σˆk ∈ Sˆk for increment of his payoff, of course the
player let to moves secretly. It provide to be sufficient to
restrict the strategic space to the two-parameter set of
2× 2 matrices,
Uˆ(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos θ/2 sin θ/2
− sin θ/2 e−iφ cos θ/2
)
(3)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi and 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi/2. From the result of the
Eisert et al. [4, 10], where various kinds of strategy are
introduced, we can find the general quantum leaps in the
game theory. Specially the strategy Qˆ⊗ Qˆ ≡ Uˆ(0, pi/2)⊗
Uˆ(0, pi/2) give a new Nash equilibrium, against to clas-
sical strategy Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ ≡ Uˆ(pi, 0) ⊗ Uˆ(pi, 0). Here, we will
briefly depict the evolution of qubit state. The prepared
initial state of the two qubit, to play on the game, is
denoted by |ψ0〉 = Jˆ |00〉. Next the participants, Alice
and Bob, play own’s qubit using the unitary operation
Uˆk. The state of the game is prepared, after the previous
strategic process, like that
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ†(UˆA ⊗ UˆB)|ψ0〉 (4)
where |ψf 〉 means the final state of the game, see figure in
[4]. Before we measure the final state, the Alice’s payoff
can be expected as Π¯A = αPCˆCˆ +βPDˆCˆ + δPCˆDˆ+γPDˆDˆ
where PΣˆAΣˆB = |〈ΣˆAΣˆB |ψf 〉|2 is the measurable prob-
ability with corresponding payoff as the coefficient re-
spectively. If the each qubit is measured by appropriate
device, then each player obtains the corresponding payoff
which is a resultant value of the quantum PD. For exam-
ple, the case of τ = pi/2 and Qˆ⊗ Qˆ build up to the new
Nash equilibrium {α, α} from the classical equilibrium
{γ, γ}. That is, the classical Pareto optimal correspond
to the new stable point of the PD.
Now we will compute the new Nash equilibrium in the
PD, which is occurred by the some additional quantum
strategy such as Walsh-Hadamard transformation H ,
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(5)
or Pauli operations
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σy =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (6)
First of all the initial state |ψ0〉 let to be the maximally
entangled state, changing the variational value τ from
0 to pi/2 and the choice of U˜ . For instance, if the en-
tangled measure τ fix to pi/2 and the umpire’s choice U˜
select to Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ, then the value Jˆ is locked up [4, 9]
like that Jˆ = e(ipiDˆ⊗Dˆ/4) = 1√
2
(Iˆ⊗2 + iDˆ⊗2), where Iˆ
means the identity operation. Therefore, we obtain the
maximally entangled state, denoted by ˜|ψ0〉 = Jˆ |00〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ i|11〉), and sequentially get to the separable fi-
nal state ˜|ψf 〉, by the disentangling operation Jˆ† after the
local operations U˜A = Dˆ and U˜B = Dˆ are done of each
player respectively i.e., ˜|ψf 〉 = 1√2 Jˆ†(|11〉+ i|00〉) = |11〉.
Although we perform the measurement by a certain ob-
servable ΩˆA(B) with the combinations of
{α|00〉〈00|, δ(β)|01〉〈01|, β(δ)|10〉〈10|, γ|11〉〈11|}, (7)
the Nash equilibrium,
{Π¯A = tr(ΩˆA ˜|ψf 〉 ˜〈ψf |),
Π¯B = tr(ΩˆB ˜|ψf 〉 ˜〈ψf |)} = {γ, γ} (8)
with the probability 1, is obtained on this traditional
strategy. This is only the classical consequence.
But if we choose the some less quantum strategy and
full quantum strategies such as the Hadamard transfor-
mation H and Pauli matrices {σx, σy, σz}, then the new
Nash equilibrium is created, that is, we will choose the
extended strategic space Sˆ. Given the entangled state
˜|ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − i|11〉) (9)
with Jˆ = eipi(σy⊗σy)/4 transform to the final state via the
local operation U˜k = Hk ∈ Uˆk(θ, φ),
˜|ψf 〉 = 12 (|00〉 − |01〉 − |10〉+ |11〉). (10)
4The final state (10) gives Π¯A = tr(ΩˆA ˜|ψf 〉 ˜〈ψf |) = 14 (α+
δ + β + γ), that is,
{Π¯A, Π¯B} = {1
4
(α+ δ + β + γ),
1
4
(α+ β + δ + γ)}.(11)
Equation (11) is always superior to the classical equilib-
rium { 14 (α+ γ), 14 (α + γ)}. But the value δ equal to −β,
the skew-symmetric case, only gives classical payoff. If
the each player choose another strategy U˜k = σz , then
the final state will be
˜|ψf 〉 = 1√
2
Jˆ†(σxA ⊗ σxB)(|00〉+ i|11〉) = |00〉 (12)
and the expected payoff is {Π¯A, Π¯B} = {α, α}.
This value is the new Nash equilibrium within the
quantum strategy, i.e., {Π¯A(σz , σz), Π¯B(σz , σz)} ≥
{Π¯A(σz , UˆB), Π¯B(UˆA, σz)} for all Uˆk. We can conclude
that the allowed SB’s quantum strategies always predict
the human’s choice (diagonal elements), the solution of
the game. Although the classical solution to the PD us-
ing repeated game gives a equilibrium point in {α, α} [8]
as like as Eisert et al., the quantum solution to the PD is
one-shot solvable. After the expected payoff is reported
with the PD, we can confirm the solution of the NP un-
ambiguously.
B. Quantum NP Solution
The quantum solutions to the PD, two-person com-
plete information game, directly correspond to the NP,
if we consider the game NP only its reduced one-
person game. The Nash equilibrium change {γ, γ} to
{ 14 (α+ δ + β + γ), 14 (α+ δ + β + γ)} on the Hadamard
strategy. Furthermore the strategy σz creates the new
optimal equilibrium {α, α}, corresponding to the classi-
cal Pareto optimal. Therefore we can adapt the solution
of the NP from PD, as the payoff Π¯k = α. Another
words the human’s unique choice Box1 is restricted by
quantum mechanical SB’s prophecy, maybe SB’s predic-
tion is always corrected as the diagonal elements in the
given payoff matrix. This result also can be calculated by
the convex combination of the human’s pure choice [5],
let’s the human choose the Box1 with a certain proba-
bility p ∈ [0, 1] and Box2 with a probability 1 − p, then
the intermediate state of the NP (using the Hadamard
transform H) is given by
|ψf 〉〈ψf | = 1
2
(
1 2p− 1
2p− 1 1
)
. (13)
So that the expected payoff of the NP is Π¯A =
1
4 [α+(2p−
1)δ + (2p− 1)β + γ], coincide with the previous value in
the PD. If one player choose the quantum strategy, such
as σx occur a previous situation, the Nash equilibrium
Π¯A = α, this is the predicted value by SB’s Π¯B = α.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we used the payoff matrix with arbi-
trary variables and also described the performance of
quantum strategies, which enable to represent classical
strategies. Especially we regarded the one-person NP
as a two-person PD problem and then, under quantum
strategies, obtained more reasonable and uplifted solu-
tions over classical strategies. In the same strategies, we
found out the Nash equilibrium always lies along the fair
values, regardless of the payoff matrix. That is, the win-
ner is never determined by the payoff, but by the level
of strategies. Therefore the Newcomb’s paradox is not a
paradox under the fair situation.
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